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POINT I 
POST-ACCIDENT FLIGHT IS ADMISSIBLE 
TO SHOW NEGLIGENCE 
Evidence of post-accident flight is relevant to 
show negligence by creating an inference of consciousness of 
responsibility, an inference of improper lookout, or of 
recklessness. Appellant's brief, Point I, p.4. Trapp would 
create six special (and arbitrary) categories into which 
post-accident flight must fall before it is admissible. 
These special categories are not found in the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, nor are they stated in the cases themselves. 
For example, post-accident flight was admitted in 
Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co., 255 P.2d 802, 807 
(Cal. 1953) because it is "evidence of a consciousness of 
responsibility for an accident," not because there were no 
other eyewitnesses. It was admitted in Jones v. Strilecki, 
231 A.2d 558, 561 (N.J. 1967) to create "an inference of 
consciousness of lack of care and of liability for the 
occurrence." No mention was made of a special rule of 
admissibility to further the purpose of a statutory fund 
which was the defendant. The other cases cited by Fisher 
likewise do not artificially limit their holdings to the six 
special categories asserted by Trapp. 
Two of the four cases cited by Trapp to exclude 
evidence of a hit-and-run are clearly distinguishable. In 
Barnes v. Gaines, 668 P.2d 1175 (Okla. Ct. App. 1983), 
flight from the accident scene was done by means of a 
separate crime, i.e. stealing the investigating officer's 
police car. Trapp's subsequent flight did not involve such 
outrageous behavior. And, in Springer v. Adams, 140 S.E. 
390 (Ga. App. 1927) , the failure to stop after an accident 
was pleaded as an act of negligence causing the accident. 
Because it clearly did not cause the accident, a demurrer to 
the allegation was properly sustained. 
In sum, evidence of Trapp's hit-and-run was 
relevant and probative. It should have been presented to 
the jury. Without the evidence, Trapp's testimony stands 
basically unimpeached; with it, a jury verdict for Fisher is 
probable. 
POINT II 
THE PROBATIVE VALUE IS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY 
OUTWEIGHED BY UNFAIR PREJUDICE 
The trial court has discretion to weigh relevant 
evidence against unfair prejudice, and exclude evidence 
under Rule 403. In this case, however, Trapp has simply 
failed to identify what unfair prejudice or impermissible 
inference the evidence may create. The seventeen cases 
cited by Fisher in favor of admitting hit-and-run evidence 
do not mention such unfair prejudice, nor do several other 
recently uncovered cases. See Olofson v. Kilgallon, 291 
N.E.2d 600 (Mass. 1973)? Peterson v. Henning, 452 N.E.2d 135 
(111. App. 1983) . 
Of the four cases cited by Trapp in opposition, 
only Barnes v. Gaines, supra, weighed probative value 
against unfair prejudice, in that case the prejudice arising 
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from the defendant's theft of the investigating officer's 
police car. Springer v. Adams, supra, was decided on 
pleading grounds, while Freeman v, Anderson, 651 S.W.2d 450 
(Ark, 1983) and Clark v. Mask, 98 S.2d 467 (Miss. 1957) were 
apparently decided on relevancy grounds. 
Utah authority cited by Trapp is not to the 
contrary. In Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982) the 
prejudicial evidence was not relevant to causation or any 
other issue in the case. And in Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 
P. 2d 489 (Utah, 1985) the prejudicial evidence had two 
defects. First, it was remote from the accident, both in 
time and in place. Second, the evidence revealed to the 
jury that plaintiff's son had violated religious standards 
held by plaintiff, and most-likely by the jury as well. In 
contrast, Trappfs post-accident flight was immediate, both 
in time and place. Second, it does not introduce an extra-
neous issue, such as religion, which might unfairly influ-
ence a jury. 
Before the trial court can use its discretion to 
weigh relevance against prejudice, the unfair prejudice must 
be identified. The trial court's remark that hit-and-run 
evidence would "inflame the jury" merely states a conclu-
sion. (Record at 272-273). Because there is no unfair 
prejudice to Trapp from hit-and-run evidence, Trapp cannot 
take refuge in the trial court's Rule 403 discretion. 
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POINT III 
FISHER LAID AN ADEQUATE FOUNDATION 
FOR SHUPE'S TESTIMONY 
An expert, like Shupef must have sufficient 
knowledge of the essential facts of a case to render an 
intelligent opinion. Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 
(Utah 1979) . Shupe gained the necessary knowledge by 
visiting the accident site, measuring it, reading deposition 
testimony, reviewing the police report and conducting tests. 
(Record at 321-323, 326, 331, 339-41). An adequate founda-
tion was thereby laid for his opinion as to the cause of the 
accident. Edwards v. Didericksen, supra. 
Shupe's opinion (excluded by the court) as to the 
cause of the accident was inattentiveness by Trapp. (R. at 
334.) Trapp claims that Fisher needed to place in evidence 
Trappfs position when he first should have seen Fisher. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.24.) Assuming such an artificial 
foundation is required, Fisher did place that point into 
evidence. Shupe testified that Trapp was about 14 6 feet 
from the point of impact when Fisher began to cross the 
street. (R. at 338-339.) Shupe assumed that point to be 
the place where Trapp first should have seen Fisher. 
Trapp objected to Shupefs conclusion that he was 
inattentive on the ground Shupe did not consider the 
lighting or passing cars which may have blocked his view. 
(R. at 332.) The jury was not required to believe Trapp's 
claim that it was too dark to see Fisher, and that passing 
cars may have blocked his vision. Likewise, Shupe was not 
required to 
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assume the truth of Trapp's claims either, while arriving at 
his opinion. Shupe's testimony that Trapp's inattention 
caused the accident was therefore improperly excluded. The 
subsequent admission of Shupe's testimony on rebuttal 
weakened the testimony by placing it in an unfair light. 
Appellant's Brief, Point VII, p.14. 
CONCLUSION 
Evidence that Trapp was a hit-and-run driver is 
relevant to show a consciousness of guilt, improper lookout, 
recklessness and to impeach his testimony. While that 
evidence may "inflame" the jury to draw such permissible 
inferences, it is.not unfairly prejudicial to Trapp. Thus, 
the trial court did not have the discretion to exclude 
post-accident flight under Rule 403. 
Furthermore, Fisher's expert, Shupe, was wrongful-
ly prevented from telling the jury that Trapp's inattentive-
ness caused the accident. Shupe's calculations of Trapp's 
position when Fisher began to cross the street firmly 
grounded his opinion on the facts of the case. These two 
errors raise a reasonable likelihood that Fisher would have 
received a more favorable result had there been no error. 
This case should be remanded for a new trial. 
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